In the aftermath of Boston, The New York Times reported the following events occurring many months prior to the day of the bombings:
- Mar., 2011 (25 mos. pre-Marathon) – Russian authorities requested the F.B.I. investigate Tamerlan Tsarnaev (a/k/a Terrorist #1), a person the Russians long suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. The F.B.I. reported it conducted a “thorough” investigation of Tamerlan and found “nothing” unusual. The Russians followed up later with a request to the C.I.A. to provide the information collected by the F.B.I. in its investigation of Tamerlan.
- Oct., 2011 (18 mos. pre-Marathon) – The C.I.A. entered Tamerlan’s name into 2 federal “watch list” databases designed to alert authorities whenever a “person of interest” suspected of involvement in terrorist activity attempted travel to an overseas destination.
- Jan., 2012 (15 mos. pre-Marathon) – A “ping” alert from a federal “watch list” database, initiated by Tamerlan’s departure to Russia, was sent to a U.S. Customs official assigned to the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force. Unfortunately, this government official did not share this alert with the Boston police, F.B.I., C.I.A., or Homeland Security.
- Jul., 2012 (9 mos. pre-Marathon) – Tamerlan returned to the U.S. after a 6-month stay in Russia. His return did not initiate another “ping” alert to the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Boston police, F.B.I., C.I.A., or Homeland Security because Tamerlan’s name listing in the “watch list” databases had “expired” according to Janet Napolitano, Director of Homeland Security.
It’s clear from this Times story that serious mistakes were made by multiple government intelligence security agencies months prior to the Boston attacks. Could this be just a coincidence or the tip of the iceberg of government mismanagement of its security resources deployed to prevent domestic terrorism? Given the circumstances of how long the Boston terrorists and their families lived in the U.S., how freely they lived at the expense of taxpayers, and how easily they traveled wherever they desired, one can expect other government blunders to be uncovered before this story is completed. The probability of “more to come” leaves many of us feeling uneasy and vulnerable to the next radicalized cell of jihadists with dreams of murdering Americans. Can we afford to continue burying our heads in the sand about recurring government failures that make us easy targets for Islamic extremists? There are lessons to be learned from Boston. One, the public’s blind faith in government to protect them from terrorism must change. Two, we must actively seek to revamp how our national security services are managed.
The government’s failure to seize multiple opportunities to stop the Boston jihadists from killing means it’s now incumbent upon us to protect ourselves from the incompetence of government bureaucrats. First, as individuals, we must raise our awareness of our surroundings by keeping our eyes and ears open to anything that appears “not right” wherever we find ourselves whether at home, work, or play. Second, we must not allow government to repeat the mistakes of Boston or anywhere else ever again. The Times revelations prove that government security officials failed to prevent what should have been prevented. Why did this happen? It happened because our security teams were poorly managed resulting in many missed opportunities to identify and stop the terrorists from carrying out their diabolic plan of hatred. In response to these indefensible government mistakes, we must resolve to overhaul the management of our government intelligence security services. This change must be implemented within those bureaus directly responsible for protecting the public from Islamic fundamentalist terror.
How Did this BAD Management Situation Come About?
If we’re going to aspire to improve the management of government intelligence security, we must first understand how this situation came to be so bad. To begin with, think about how little managerial selection has changed in government since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. From the earliest days of the republic, over 200 years ago, the predominant approach to identifying and selecting managers for government service has been the exclusive reliance on subjective and arbitrary qualifying criteria. Throughout this period, as everything else in American society evolved, our public sector recruitment methods stood still by ignoring science as a valuable tool for choosing its managers. This happened despite the success of science in providing most, if not all, of the technology-driven comforts we all enjoy. Why? First and foremost, it’s human nature “to take care of one’s own” whether that means taking care of one’s own family member, one’s family friend, or one’s powerful ally. Hence, over the years, the most suitable candidates for management in government, those with the strongest innate managerial talents, were mostly passed over for other candidates possessing inferior leadership abilities but having better political connections. Does this sound wise to you?
These managerial recruitment and selection shortcomings in government thrived over the years despite the obvious bias toward the well-connected and the ongoing high costs to society. “What high costs?” you ask. First, the aptitude-rich but passed over managerial candidates are today (as they were then) relegated to jobs allowing them minimal use of their natural leadership abilities. This engenders frustration as their most productive ability, managing, goes unrealized throughout their careers. Second, the aptitude-poor but chosen ersatz managers are also frustrated and even depressed in many instances because they constantly struggle to become what they can never be – effective managers. The reason: When a manager lacks the innate talents to manage well, he struggles and his entire team struggles with him. This situation results in a stagnant or declining organization with progressively deteriorating effectiveness. There’s also a greater than necessary budgetary cost to taxpayers because of increased operational deficiencies. Most importantly, there’s a human cost of government ineffectiveness such as in Boston where multiple agencies failed miserably in their mission to keep civilians safe.
So, where do we go from here? The solution to this problem of poor management of our government intelligence security services is found in human engineering science. This science is a branch of industrial psychology that deals specifically with the scientific measurement of people’s aptitudes for all types of work. What are aptitudes? Aptitudes are the innate abilities or talents people have for doing or learning certain things quickly. Human engineering scientists explain that if a person is assigned to the job of manager or supervisor, but he doesn’t have strong managerial aptitudes, he and his team will be set up for inevitable failure. [1]
Once again, this brings us back to Boston. Why weren’t the Boston terrorists discovered and stopped by our government security specialists before they acted? The answer is frustratingly simple: A person hired or promoted to manage (or supervise) in government who possesses inadequate managerial aptitudes is called a MINO (Manager In Name Only). A MINO holds a manager’s title but lacks the natural born talents (i.e., aptitudes) needed to be an effective leader. How do we know that MINOs were in charge of Boston’s security? Besides the news story describing multiple intelligence security blunders, there are other clues from the tragic outcome there. When government employees are managed by MINOs, they become frustrated, discontented, unaccountable, and prone to mistakes. Does “prone to mistakes” ring a familiar bell?
Your next question: “How did poor management in government security become so pervasive that it resulted in the failures of Boston?” The answer is provided by the managerial behavior I call the Backfill Selection Multiplier. [2] Explanation: Most managers, including those in government, have the authority to backfill managerial or supervisory positions vacated by departing employees. And because employee turnover in MINO-managed organizations is so high, MINOs are continuously backfilling open managerial positions. Unfortunately, they tend to replace the available managerial slots with managers selected in their own likeness, falsely seeing themselves as good managerial role models. Once hired, however, these new-hire MINOs exacerbate the organization’s problems by further replicating their boss’s ineffective leadership behaviors in the agency’s lower level organizational units. This way, replacement MINOs, who are as ill-equipped to manage as their superiors, create a counterproductive trickle-down effect on those who report to them. From the top MINO down through the chain of command, poor managerial decisions propagate from MINO to supervisor to subordinate, resulting in ever-decreasing morale and ever-increasing employee turnover. All of this accelerates the organization’s downward spiral into ineffectiveness. Did government intelligence security forces demonstrate this pervasively inferior management when they failed to prevent the Boston attacks? In my estimation, there’s no doubt about it.
On the leadership spectrum 180 degrees opposite the MINO is the HUGM (Highly Unusual Great Manager). What makes this manager great? A HUGM possesses the optimal mix of strong managerial aptitudes. These are called the Sublime Nine Management Aptitudes and include the following attributes: interpersonal, intrapersonal, linguistic, analytical, inductive, visionary, mathematical, clerical, and adaptable. [2] What’s more, these managerial talents are innate; that is, you’re born with them (or not). Furthermore, you can be scientifically tested for these aptitudes via human engineering science. Unfortunately, government-employed HUGMs are mostly non-existent. Why? Because there’s simply no incentive for government to identify, hire, and deploy HUGMs within the bureaucracy. Let’s be honest. Ineffective management in government means greater job security for everyone employed in government. Have you ever seen a government agency reduce its employee headcount for poor performance or incompetence? Not once that I’ve ever seen; not even after a “Boston” or a “Benghazi!”
Just think of what could be accomplished by government with managers who possess the Sublime Nine managerial aptitudes. The positive effect on public safety over the long-term is inestimable. To get the discussion started, I provide a partial list of benefits I think would result from the government’s hiring of HUGMs for its intelligence security services:
- Increased agency efficiency and employee effectiveness.
- Reduced agency fraud, waste, and abuse of taxpayer dollars.
- Better designed and integrated terrorism information systems.
- Better agency decision making and problem solving at all levels.
- Improved U.S. and intl. interagency terrorism information sharing.
- Improved technologies for bomb sniffing, detection, and defusing.
- More “best practices” procedures for investigating and stopping terrorists.
- Enhanced systems for monitoring and alerting authorities of terrorist travel.
- Fewer losses of life and injuries and reduced property damage from terrorism.
- More timely and complete anti-terrorism reporting to security oversight officials.
What gives me the confidence these benefits would result from HUGMs in government? As stated before, HUGMs possess the natural abilities to manage effectively. In addition, they have the unique talent to discern the strongest aptitudes of their employees, and as a consequence, HUGMs assign their employees to jobs best suited for their specific abilities. This optimization of team member talent creates high performance work units. Furthermore, these teams work synergistically with each other to accomplish their agency’s mission. With government security teams of this high caliber, there’s little doubt that exceptional performance could be achieved under the able stewardship of HUGMs.
What then is the best way to fix this problem of bad management in the government intelligence security complex? Scientific aptitude testing specifically administered to identify and promote HUGMs from within the intelligence security bureaucracy is the right solution. It’s an undeniable truth that identifying and selecting managers via aptitude testing is the only objective way to ensure the very best managers are deployed in agencies we rely upon to protect us from terrorism.
A Bold 1st Step is Required to Achieve Fundamental Change
My hope is the tragic and preventable losses of Boston will spawn a ground swell of public pressure for change in government security management. What would this “change” look like? Please tell your legislators not to waste time by enacting a bunch of laws that will only patch the symptoms of perpetual government failure. Instead, you must demand they implement an innovative human resources (HR) approach that will fundamentally change the quality of management within our government security agencies. Specifically, demand they begin by transforming the management of a large federal agency responsible for anti-terrorism intelligence or for the investigation of suspected visa violators. The HR department of this “pilot” agency would implement the managerial recruitment ideas presented in this article and systematically replace agency managers and supervisors who leave the organization due to normal attrition. Scientific aptitude testing of managerial candidates would enable the HR team to replace every departing MINO with a corresponding HUGM throughout the agency. As HUGMs are progressively deployed, the agency would reap huge returns in productivity and effectiveness in carrying out its anti-terrorism mission. Once this initial pilot proves to be highly successful, the HUGM floodgates will open and a torrent of pent-up demand for managerial excellence will be demanded by the entire government intelligence security community. Critically important is that by fundamentally improving how agency managers and supervisors are chosen, our government will have embarked on a path to significantly upgrade its performance protecting Americans from future al-Qaeda inspired, trained, and supported terrorism.
[1] For more information on human engineering science and to learn what scientific aptitude testing has done to improve the careers of people just like you, visit the Johnson O’Connor Research Foundation homepage.
[2] Natural Born Manager (Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing, 2009), pgs. 4, 12, 58.